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Escheat, Unclaimed Property
and the Supreme Court
R. Perry Sentell, Jr.
Escheat and unclaimed property statutes have been utilized by states
not only for the acquisition of 'revenue but also for the regulation of the
disposition of unclaimed property. Professor Sentell traces the chro-
nology of the Supreme Court's treatment of these statutes as applied to
real, personal and intangible property. His analysis reveals that the
Court's early restrictive attitude toward escheat legislation has gradually
been displaced by an increasing tendency to allow the states wider lati-
tude in their treatment of unclaimed property.
N ALL BUSINESSES, the time comes for taking stock. The
'business of judicially deciding cases is no exception. When, on
February 1, 1965, the United States Supreme Court decided the
case of Texas v. New Jersey,' it initiated corrective measures which
may eventually eliminate the
THE AUr~oR (AM., University of disorder currently prevailing in
Georgia, LL.B., University of Georgia, respect to the Court's treatment
LL.M., Harvard University) is an As- of state escheat statutes!
sociate Professor of Law at the University
of Georgia and is a member of the The historical background
Georgia Bar. of statutory development in
this area has been well cov-
ered.a The existence of the escheat concept in England4 - and its
common law companion, bona vacantid - exemplify early efforts
by the Crown to effect the disposition of both real and personal own-
erless property. These concepts as originally transmitted to this
country were generally limited to the property of intestates with-
out lawful heirs.' The modern escheat statutes, however, are state
1379 U.S. 674 (1965).
2 The term "escheat" is of French derivation, signifying "to happen." BLACK, LAW
DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
a Garrison, Escheats, Abandoned Property Acts, and Their Revenue Aspects, 35 KY.
LJ. 302 (1947); Hardman, The Law of Escheat, 4 LAw Q. REV. 318 (1888); Locke,
Escheat of Funds of Unknown Persons - Interpretations of an Ancient Statute, 29
CONN. BJ. 123 (1955).
4 As the concept existed in England, escheat was necessarily connected to the feudal
tenure system of landholding, operating so as to pass land from a tenant dying without
heirs back to the tenant's lord or to the King himself. See Hardman, supra note 3.
5 By the concept of bona vacantia ownerless personal property passed directly to the
Crown. See Comment, Bona Vacantia Resurrected, 34 ILL. L. REv. 171 (1939).
6 The transmission was so complete and the matter was one of such individual state
regulation that by 1947 it was commonplace to report the existence of escheat statutes
in all states. See Garrison, supra note 3.
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tools for presuming the property owner's death in certain rinstances
and, more importantly, for constituting his apparent abandonment
of property, which is sufficient cause for the state's assumption of
dominion over it.7 Early harvest reaped with these ,tools8 stimu-
lated state efforts to ever extend their reach, resulting in almost
complete statutory coverage of real and personal property, both
tangible and intangible.9
Only one indication of wide-spread interest in these statutory de-
velopments was the promulgation, in 1954, of the Uniform Dispo-
sition of Unclaimed Property Act1" by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. This act itself was an at-
tempt to give some semblance of order to the chaotic conditions re-
sulting from conflicting state grabs for unclaimed property."
From the earliest times, of course, many state efforts to escheat
property have passed in review before the United' States Supreme
Court, and naturally, the Court's decisions on the subject have in-
fluenced the trend of these efforts. Therefore, what follows is a
straight-forward, chronological account of where the Court started,
where it has now arrived, and the stopover points along the way. 2
7 See discussion in Garrison, supra note 3. Writers on the subject have, purported
to draw a line between escheat statutes, passing tide from owner to state by couit ad-judication, and custodial statutes, passing custody of the property to the state subject to
the owner's claim. See, e.g., McBride, Unclaimed Dividends, Escheat Statutes and the
Corporation Lawyer, 14 Bus. LAW. 1062 (1959); Shestack, Disposition of Unclaimed
Property - A Proposed Model Act, 46 ILL. L REv. 48 (1951). Examinatioi indi-
cates, however, that some of the states utilize combinations of the two approaches,
rendering the attempt to classify statutes most difficult, and leading others to conclude
that "there is no 'typical', statute of either type." Comment, 59 MICIs. L. REv. 756, 7,0
n.31 (1961).
8These "harvests" are at the bottom of public interest in the subject, as indicated
by the press coverage. See, e.g., Malabre, States Step Up Efforts'to Gr, ' Mounting
Pile of Abandoned Property, Wall Street Journal, Jan. 22, 1962, p. 1, col., 1; Mashek,
33 States Have Controls on Banks, Dallas News, Dec. 31, 1961.,
This extensive coverage has prompted much discussion and concern. See e.g.,
Ely, Escheats: Perils and Precautions, 15 Bus. LAw. 791 (1960); Ely,.Pennsylvania
Escheat Laws: Proposals for Revision, 64 DICK. L. Rnv. 329 (1960); McBride, supra
note 7; Note, Abondoned Chattels and Intangible Things as a Source of Revenue, 42
IowA L. REV. 399 (1957).
10 9A Uniform Laws Ann. 250 (1957).
"1The Commissioners outlined their hopes for the act in the following terms:
"The Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act, if adopted by the. states, will
serve to protect the interests of owners, to relieve the holders from annoyance, expense
and liability, to preclude multiple liability, and to give the adopting state the use of
considerable sums of money that otherwise would, in effect, become a windfall to the
holders thereof." NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWS, HANDBOOK 137 (1954). See also Comment, 59 MICH. L. REV. 756 (1961),
providing a useful discussion of some of the theories behind and included in the act.
12 Although arrangement of decisions into topical or subject matter divisions pos-
sesses certain advantages, a strict chronological approach more readily adapts to the
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Although the nature of such an account renders it not overly pro-
vocative, it will hopefully be of assistance to states presently con-
sidering statutory movement, as well as to others with particular in-
terest in the subject. What follows then is an effort to provide such
an account of the Supreme Court's performance thus far.
I. THE CASES - A PANORAMA
A. In the Beginning: An Era of Restriction (1794-1900)
Perhaps an appropriate starting point for examination is Georgia
v. Brailsford,3 an early Supreme Court case in which the state was
claiming a debt that it alleged had been transferred by a state statute
during the Revolutionary War from a British creditor to the state.
In a jury trial in the Supreme Court, the state's claim was rejected.
It was held that the statute did not effect a forfeiture of the sum due
the alien enemy, but only a sequestration, and that the sequestration
did not divest the property from the alien but merely prevented his
recovery of the debt while the war continued. At the war's conclu-
sion the alien's right to the debt was revived; and the state possessed
no claim to it. Thus, at this early date the Supreme Court denied a
state's claim to property under legislation sounding much akin to
escheat.
The second case appropriate for note is Fairfax's Devisee v.
Hunter's Lessee,4 an action in ejectment in which the Court con-
sidered indirectly the escheat powers of a state against an alien.
Here, the plaintiff was claiming land in Virginia under a grant from
the state against an alien devisee of the original owner of the land.
The Court, in a majority opinion by Mr. Justice Story, held for the
defendant alien for three main reasons. First, the Court interpreted
the common law to mean that an alien could take land by purchase
or devise but not by descent; that once the lands were so taken they
could not be divested by the state until "office found," i.e., an in-
quisition or proceeding declaring the state's title to the lands.
Since no such inquisition had been made prior to the state's
grant to the plaintiff, this grant did not pass title. Second, to the
plaintiff's contention that a 1785 act of the Virginia legislature had
changed the common law by declaring these particular lands to be
historical treatment here contemplated. Moreover, the Court itself has not considered
these statutes within topical voids but has utilized the holdings of previous cases re-
gardless of the particular entity involved.
133 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1 (1794).
14 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813).
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appropriated .by the state,'5 the Court responded that this act was
unclear and would not be enlarged by implication in derogation of
the spirit of the common law. Third, the Court concluded that the
treaty of 1794 between the United States and Great Britain com-
pletely confirmed the defendant's tide.
Mr. Justice Johnson delivered a dissenting opinion in the case,
contending that the alien devisee should be considered as having
only "a mere scintilla" of interest' 6 which was extinguished by the
state's grant of the lands to the plaintiff. In regard to the majority's
holding, he countered, "there is nothing mystical, nor anything of
indispensable obligation, in this inquest of office."'" Thus, while the
majority denied, he would have affirmed the state's power of escheat
in this situation."8
Vermont, similar to the actions of the State of Virginia, passed
an act in 1794 purporting to divest property within its borders of a
private, British eleemosynary corporation and to grant the property
to the towns in which it was located. This legislative action resulted
in a suit in ejectment in 1823 by the alien corporation against the
town and its grantee, and in Society for the Propagation of the Gospel
in Foreign Parts v. Town of New Haven,9 the Supreme Court again
denied the escheat power of the state. Here, unlike the Fairfax case,
the state's legislative expression was dear; but the Court did not
hesitate to cite the "inquest of office" requirement of that case, inti-
mating that the requirement had not been met. The state's justifi-
cation of its actions was based on the contention that its courts had
no jurisdiction to control the operations of the alien corporation. This
was brushed aside by the Court on the theory "that the courts of
the country in which the corporation exists [England] will not per-
mit it to abuse the trusts confided to it, or to want their assistance,
when it may be required to enable it to perform them in a proper
way. '20  The Court also concluded that the Treaty of 1783 pro-
I5 The Court described this act as declaring "that the unappropriated lands within
the Northern Neck should be subject to the same regulations, and be granted in the
same manner, and caveats should be proceeded upon, tried and determined, as is by
law directed, in cases of other unappropriated lands belonging to the commonwealth."
Id. at 624.
16 Id. at 630.
17 Ibid.
18 Interestingly, this decision initiated the conflict between the court of appeals of
Virginia and the Supreme Court, which culminated in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), establishing the Supreme Court's power of review over
state courts.
1921 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 464 (1823).
20 Id. at 484.
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tected the rights of alien corporations and that the treaty was not ex-
tinguished by the Revolutionary War. Again the Court is seen tak-
ing a dim view of the forfeiture or escheat powers of the states.2 '
An early case presenting forfeiture or escheat by the federal
government was United States v. Repentigny,22 in which the power
was upheld. The land in question, now located in the State of
Michigan, had originally been granted by the French government
to two donees, one of whom had immediately possessed and worked
it for four years. Many years later the land had become subject to
the government of the United States, which had extinguished the
Indian tide to it, surveyed it, and sold it to inhabitants. Forty-two
years later the government was notified of the claim of the two
original donees. Denying the claim, the Supreme Court indicated
that the circumstances furnished evidence of abandonment on the
part of the donees which invited a resumption of tide by the gov-
ernment. However, the Court purported to rest its decision on the
grounds that the actions of the government concerning the land
constituted "office found" within the meaning of the Fairfax prin-
ciple. The Court did not bother to distinguish theSociety case
where it had denied what appears to. have been a similar claim to
title on the part of a state.
Shifting temporarily from the alien aspect of escheat, the case
of Mulligan v. Corbins24 presents another facet of the subject in
which the Supreme Court was early interested. The fact situation
here -before the Court indicated that an attorney in Kentucky had
been employed by the proper state official to sue and obtain an
escheat judgment in regard to certain property there for the con-
sideration of "a moiety of the property recovered."25  The attorney
obtained the escheat judgment and purported to sell and deliver the
property to the plaintiff. At this point, the state legislature passed
an act releasing the state's interest in the land to the defendant.
The Supreme Court affirmed the state court's rejection of the plain-
tiff's contention that the legislative act unconstitutionally impaired
the contract of employment between the state and the attorney.
21 The Court repeated the "inquest of office" requirements in a number of other
cases. See, e.g., Phillips v. Moore, 100 U.S. 208 (1879); Osterman v. Baldwin, 73 U.S.
(6 Wall.) 116 (1867); Cross v. Del Valle, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 5 (1863); Taylor v.
Bentham, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 232 (1847); Governeur's Heirs v. Robertson, 24 U.S.
(11 Wheat.) 332 (1826).
2272 U.S. (5 Wall.) 211 (1886).
23 See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
2 4 74 US. (7 Wall.) 487 (1869).
25 1d. at 488.
[Vol. 17:50
. STATE ESCHEAT STATUTES
The Court held that the attorney's only power was to obtain the es-
cheat judgment for which he must be paid the agreed consideration.
Going further and attempting to sell the property on behalf of the
state he exceeded his scope of authority; further, it was the right of the
legislature to release to the defendant the state's interest in the land.
Although the facts might tend to indicate that this decision was
grounded on sympathy more than on a technicality, the case also evi-
dences a willingness on the part of the Court to allow the state full
discretion to alter its policy.
Rounding the circle, the Court, in the case of Hauenstein v.
Lynham,26 again thwarted the efforts of Virginia to center the im-
pact of its escheat laws upon aliens.
Upon the death, intestate and without heirs, of a Swiss National
who owned lands in Virginia, the district escheator prosecuted and
obtained a judgment of escheat. Before the property was sold,
citizens- and residents of Switzerland filed a claim for it as heirs of
the deceased owner. Reversing the Court of Appeals of Virginia,
the Supreme Court upheld the aliens' claim, holding that under an
1850 treaty between the United States and Switzerland it was their
right to sell the property and export the proceeds. The Court rejected
Virginia's syllogistic argument: that since the treaty provided that the
various states should enact statutes setting time limits within which
such aliens could exercise their rights and as Virginia had enacted no
statute, then these aliens possessed no rights under the 'treaty. Here
again in evidence was the Court's watchfulness over the state's ap-
plication of escheat statutes to persons beyond its jurisdiction.- More-
over, the treaty was impliedly held to change the Fairfax declaration
of the common law, that aliens could take property by devise but not
by descent, or at least to modify it so as to allow aliens to enjoy the
proceeds from the property.
Statutes might also make various uses of particular property
the cause for its confiscation by the state. At an early date the
Supreme Court was faced with the construction of a similar statute
at the federal level - an attempt to regulate human conduct by
utilizing the weapon of forfeiture or escheat. In Late Corp. of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States" under
attack were actions by the United States Government to curb the
polygamy practices of the Mormons. The government, under auth-
ority of an act of Congress, which declared subject to forfeiture and
28100 U.S. 483 (1880).
27 136 U.S. 1 (1890).
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escheat the property of corporations obtained or held in violation of
the law prohibiting the practice of polygamy, dissolved the plaintiff
religious corporation in the territory of Utah and directed the wind-
ing up of its affairs. In a lengthy opinion, a majority of the Court
upheld the contested actions of the government.28 In sustaining
the power of Congress to revoke the charter of the society, the
Court emphasized the "general and plenary"2 9 authority of the
United States over its territories. As to the seizure and holding of
the property of the corporation, the Court reviewed the "contempt of
authority and resistance to law on the part of the Mormons"3 in
their practice of polygamy, and again condoned the action of the
Government. Though professing not to pass on the question, the
Court also indicated approval of the legislation's eventual disposal
of the property by devoting its use to the schools of the territory.
A dissenting opinion for three Justices on the Court"' agreed to
the power of Congress to prohibit the practice of polygamy in the
territories but would not concur to "that power to seize and confis-
cate the property of persons, individuals, or corporations, without
office found, because they may have been guilty of criminal prac-
tic e s. 
'32
Undoubtedly, the most important escheat decision of the Su-
preme Court in this section was that rendered in the case of Hamil-
ton v. Brown.3" Here, the owner of the land in question, located in
Texas, had died intestate and the state had entered a suit for escheat
as provided by statute. After ten years, during which time notice
of the impending escheat was published and intervening claims were
determined, a judgment of escheat to the state was rendered. Fol-
lowing specified procedures, the lands were then sold to the defend-
ant. The plaintiffs in the case, allegedly heirs of the original owner
and residents of states other than Texas, contended that the defend-
ant's title under the escheat proceedings was invalid for three pri-
mary reasons: first, the Texas constitution repealed the escheat stat-
ute of the state; second, the escheat proceeding violated the taking-
without-just-compensation provision of the United States Constitu-
2 8 Mr. Justice Bradley wrote the majority opinion.
2 9 Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States,
136 U.S. 1, 42 (1890).
So Id. at 49.
31 Mr. Chief Justice Fuller and Justices Field and lamar. Id. at 66.
32 Id. at 67.
33 161 U.S. 256 (1896).
[VoL 17:50
STATE ESCHEAT STATUTES
tion; and third, the judgment impaired the original owner's con-
tract of grant.
In upholding the defendant's escheat title to the land, the Court,
in an opinion by Mr. Justice Gray, considered the concept of escheat
from an historical standpoint and stated that "in this country, when
the title to land fails for want of heirs and devisees, it escheats to
the State as part of its common ownership, either by mere operation
of law, or upon an inquest of office, according to the law of the par-
ticular State." 4  Next, the Court examined the specific procedural
provisions of the Texas escheat statute and concluded that its alleged
conflict with the state constitution would affect only the separable
sale provisions of the statute and not the judgment of escheat which
proved title not to be in the plaintiff. To the plaintiff's federal
constitutional contentions, the Court responded as follows:
When a man dies the legislature is under no constitutional obliga-
tion to leave the title to his property, real or personal, in abeyance
for an indefinite period; but it may provide for promptly ascertain-
ing, by appropriate judicial proceedings, who has succeeded to his
estate. If such proceedings are had, after actual notice b' service
of summons to all known claimants, and constructive notice by
publication to all possible claimants who are unknown, the final
determination of the right of succession, either among private per-
sons, as in the ordinary administration of estates, or between all
persons and the State, as by inquest of office or similar process to
determine whether the estate has escheated to the public, is due
process of law; and a statute providing for such proceedings and
determination does not impair the obligation of any contract con-
tained in the grant under which the former owner held, whether
that grant was from the State or from a private person.3 5
The Court's opinion in the Hamilton case has been quoted rather
extensively for several reasons. First, the decision seems to indicate
a breaking of the shackles which had appeared to restrain the Court
in some of the other early escheat cases. Second, the attacks on the
Texas escheat statutes in this case are some of the major ones which
continue to be leveled at unclaimed property legislation. Finally,
the opinion appropriately concludes this examination of the early
cases and serves as an apt point of departure for a look at the more
modern cases of the middle ages.
B. The Middle Ages: An Era of Transition (1900-1948)
The Supreme Court, upon moving into the 1900's, found itself
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tion of state escheat legislation as well as cases having factual situa-
tions substantively appropriate for analysis here.
Although the dividing line between the cases previously dis-
cussed and those to be examined in this section may be more fic-
tional than real, the Court's reactions, as viewed against the back-
ground of its earlier decisions, depict the judicial evolvement of
crucial doctrines pertaining to escheat and unclaimed property stat-
utes.
The first of the transition age cases, Cunnius v. Reading School
Dist.,.8 reached the court in 1905. In issue was the constitu-
tionality of a Pennsylvania statute "relating to the grant of let-
ters of administration upon the estates of persons presumed
to be dead, by reason of long absence from their former domi-
cile." In effect, this statute provided that upon the fulfillment
of specified procedural requirements - including advertise-
ment in the county newspaper, a court hearing, and publication of
notice - the appropriate court was to authorize the administration
of estates of persons who had been absent for a period of seven
years or more. During a nine year absence of the plaintiff, letters
of administration were granted as authorized by the statute, follow-
ing which the administrator collected from the defendant, Reading
School District, certain interest payments due her. Upon her reap-
pearance, the plaintiff brought an action for these payments, arguing
that the entire procedure established by the statute for the adminis-
tration of her property was unconstitutional. Affirming the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania, the Court upheld the state statute and
its application to the plaintiff. Considering first the plaintiff's con-
tention that this was a matter so beyond the state's authority as to
make the statute violative of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, the Court purported to find historical bottom for the
legislation in the laws of Rome, France, Germany, and England.
Slightly troublesome to the Court was its own earlier decision in
the case of Scott v. McNeal, 8 holding invalid the jurisdiction of a
Washington probate court over the estate of one who, though be-
lieved dead, was in fact alive. The Court explained, however, that
in that case, unlike here, the State of Washington had possessed
no express absentee-owner legislation, but had attempted to find
support for its actions in its general administration laws. Thus,
36 198 U.S. 458 (1905).
37 Ibid.
38 154 U.S. 34 (1894).
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that holding was in no way determinative of the situation here pre-
sented "as it cannot be denied that in substance the Pennsylvania
statute is a special proceeding for the administration of the estates
of absentees distinct from the general law of that State providing for
the settlement of the estates of deceased persons .... ""
The Court then proceeded to dispose of the plaintiff's other
fourteenth amendment contentions rather summarily. In doing so,
it held reasonable the seven-year period of absence required by the
statute, as well as its notice provisions and other specifications in
regard to absent owners who appeared following the administration
of their estates.
In fastening upon the absenteeism of the owner to provide suf-
ficient grounds for the presumption of his death and the consequent
administration of his estate, the Pennsylvania statute closely ap-
proached the utilization of the abandonment concept found in modern
unclaimed property statutes. The Supreme Court, in giving the
Pennsylvania statute full effect, notwithstanding the fact that the
owner was not dead, indicated a realization of the law's potentialities
and a willingness to permit state experimentation with the subject.
Evidence of the full significance of the decision was shortly forth-
coming.
In 1911, the Supreme Court heard the first contest over a pure
abandoned property statute in the case of Provident Institution for
Say. v. Malone,4" in which a savings bank in Boston contended that
the Massachusetts statute was unconstitutional. The statute provided
that the attorney general could apply to the probate court for an
order of payment to the state treasurer of deposits held by savings
institutions when no deposit had been made, no interest had been
added on the passbook, no check had been drawn against the account
for a period of thirty years, and no claimant or depositor could be
found. In making the application, a copy of the petition had been
served on the bank; and a citation addressed to the depositors had
been published in the newspapers. The statute further provided
that money so paid to the treasurer was to be held subject to the
claims of its true owner who would also receive a certain rate of
interest.
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute but, de-
termined that the bank did possess sufficient interest in the mat-
ter to make the complaint. The Court appeared to approach the
3 9 Cunnius v. Reading School Dist., 198 U.S. 458, 476 (1905).
40221 U.S. 660 (1911).
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statute with the view that its passage was for the sole protection
of the depositors. '"The right and power so to legislate," said the
Court, "is undoubted,"' citing as its only authority one previous
case - Cunnius v. Reading School Dist.42
Explaining that this was not an escheat statute but a mere cus-
todial provision, the Court noted that the charter and by-laws of
the savings bank did not prevent, upon its dissolution, payment of
unknown depositors' shares to their legal representatives. Thus, the
power to appoint the state as such representative, prior to dissolu-
don, seemed to follow. To the plaintiff's contentions against the
statute's applicability only to abandoned deposits in savings banks,
the Court responded, "the classification is reasonable."4
Certainly the Supreme Court's decision in the Provident Institu-
tion case constitutes a milestone in the interpretation of abandoned
property statutes. Although the opinion does indicate the possibility
of one or two limitations on the power of the state here, and though
it might be argued thai the Court deluded itself by only seeing in
the statute advantage for the depositors, the patient for most
practical purposes was at last examined and appeared to receive a
rather pervasive clean bill of health.
Perhaps affording little more than transitional interest but
nevertheless upholding escheat legislation was the Court's decision
in Christianson v. King County.44 Here attacked were escheat
actions under statutes of the territory of Washington providing that
upon the death of an intestate leaving no heirs, his estate should
escheat to the county in which it was situated. In an opinion by
Mr. Justice Hughes, the Court held that as Congress had neither
legislated upon the subject in the territories nor prohibited the terri-
torial legislature from doing so, the statute was authorized. Also
sustained was the contested power of the probate court to declare
the escheat after determining the absence of heirs. The Court
concluded its opinion: "It is apparent that there was no deprivation
of property without due process of law. The court, after appropriate
notice, did determine that there were no heirs and its decree being
the act of a court of competent jurisdiction under a valid statute
bound all the world including the plaintiff in error."45
Returning to greener pastures, in 1923 two cases brought the
41 Id. at 664.
42 198 U.S. 458 (1905).
4 3 Provident Institution for Say. v. Malone, 221 U.S. 660, 666 (1911).
44239 U.S. 356 (1915).
45 Id. at 373.
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Supreme Court face to face with another state statute relating to un-
claimed bank deposits. This statute belonged to California and
provided for the initiation of an action to escheat to the state de-
posits held by any bank which had remained unclaimed for more
than twenty years without a further deposit, withdrawal, or notice to
the bank of current residence of the depositor.
In the first case, First Nat'l Bank v. California,4" Mr. Justice
McReynolds' opinion for the Court held that this escheat statute
could not be applied to deposits in national banks. These banks
were seen as instrumentalities of the federal government, created
by laws whose purpose was to erect a banking system extending
throughout the country; and this purpose could not be frustrated by
state legislation. The California escheat statute would cause frus-
tration by attempting "to qualify in an unusual way agreements be-
tween national banks and their customers long understood to arise
when the former receives deposits under their plainly granted
powers."4  Further, said the Court, "the depositors of a national
bank often live in many different States and countries; and certainly
it would not be an immaterial thing if the deposits of all were sub-
ject to seizure by the State where the bank happened to be
located. 48The opinion of the Court in the second case, Security Sa'. Bank
v. California," was rendered five months after that in the First
Nat'l Bank case, and upheld the escheat statute against the constitu-
tional attack of a state bank. Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice
Brandeis closely examined the procedural provisions of the statute.
If these provisions were adequate, he declared, then the constitu-
tional attack was foreclosed by the Provident Institution decision.
Further, "it is no concern of the bank's whether the State receives
the money merely as depository or takes it as an escheat."" Answer-
ing the bank's argument that the statute's provisions for service were
not adequate to bind all depositors and that hence the bank would
still be liable to them, Brandeis reasoned that the required seizure
of the res was effected by personal service upon the bank, and that
"there is no constitutional objection to considering the proceeding
as in personam, so far as concerns the bank; as quasi in rem, as far
as concerns the depositors; and as strictly in rem, as far as concerns
46262 U.S. 366 (1923).
47 Id. at 370.
48 Ibid.
49 263 U.S. 282 (1923).
5o Id. at 286.
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other claimants."'" So considered, the service provisions were ade-
quate to bind all interested persons. To the objection that the
statute allowed service by publication without requiring an affidavit
that personal service was impossible, it was held that this determina-
tion by the state legislature was not a denial of due process. Brandeis'
response to the contention that the statute improperly provided for
publication of notice in the county of the state capital rather than
in the county where the particular bank was located is indicative of
his approach to the entire situation. Said he: "Obviously the ques-
tion 'is one of local experience on which the court ought to be very
slow to declare that the state legislature was wrong in its facts, or
abused its discretion.' ",2
Exactly what had the Court done up to this point? In the
Provident Institution case the application to a bank (presumably a
state bank) of a so-called custodial type state statute was approved,
the Court intimating that its holding on an escheat type statute
might have been different. In the Security Say. Bank case, however,
the Court expressly declared that it was immaterial which type stat-
ute was involved, so far as a state bank was concerned. Finally,
the Court's decision in the First Nat'l Bank case, while holding an
escheat type statute inapplicable to national banks, appeared to rely
primarily upon the element of state interference with the national
banking system and little upon the fact that the statute involved was
in the escheat classification. These observations become pertinent
as this examination continues.
The year 1923 saw a recurrence of the problem of state escheat
statutes regarding aliens. In the landmark case of Terrace v.
Thompson53 a six-member majority of the Court54 sustained a stat-
ute of the state of Washington prohibiting the ownership of land
by aliens who had not declared their intention to become United
States citizens, and providing that land conveyed to or for the use
of these aliens was thereby forfeited to the state. Holding first that
the statute was not violative of the due process clause of the federal
constitution, the Court viewed its enactment as coming under the
state's "wide discretion in determining its own public policy and what
measures are necessary for its own protection and properly to pro-
mote the safety, peace and good order of its people."' 5 The statute was
51 Id. at 287.
52 Id. at 290.
53263 U.S. 197 (1923).
54 Justices McReynolds, Brandeis, and Sutherland were not included in this majority.
55 263 U.S. at 217.
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further held valid as against equal protection contentions upon the
basis that the state's classification of aliens was substantial and reas-
onable. United States citizens, it was held, possessed no constitutional
right to lease their lands to aliens lawfully prohibited from taking
the lease. An argument by the plaintiffs founded upon a treaty be-
tween the United States and Japan was brushed aside.
A substantially similar alien land statute of the State of Cali-
fornia was upheld by the Court in the same year." Two years
later, in 1925, the Court was called upon to adjudge another aspect
of the California statute, viz., its provision that a prima fade pre-
sumption of the intent to avoid the escheat penalty would arise
from proof that property was taken in the name of a citizen but
consideration for the property was paid by an alien. In Cockrill v.
California57 the Court unanimously sustained this rule of evidence,
holding no violation of equal protection because "there is a rational
connection between the facts and the intent authorized to be in-
ferred from them,""8 and because "the equal protection clause does
not require absolute uniformity, or prohibit every distinction in the
laws of the State between ineligible aliens and other persons within
its jurisdiction."5  Likewise of no value to the assailants was the
treaty between the United States and Japan. This treaty, it was
held, furnished no protection to aliens against a rule of evidence
which did not violate the due process or equal protection clauses
of the federal constitution.
From the results of this most recent rash of alien escheat decis-
ions, an observer might well be'persuaded to revise his conclusions
drawn from some of the early more restrictive holdings. But, as
will be seen later in this section, the Supreme Court was not yet
finished.
With the exception of a per curiam opinion, 0 the Court saw
little escheat or abandoned property action until 1938, when the
quiet was broken by the storm of United States v. Klein."' In that
case, the United States was contesting the validity of a Pennsylvania
statute which authorized the escheat of money paid into federal
SO See, e.g., Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923); Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313
(1923); Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923).
57268 U.S. 258 (1925).
58 Id. at 261.
59 Id. at 262.
60 National City Bank v. Philippine Islands, 302 U.S. 651 (1937), reversing a
decision by the Supreme Court of the Philippines upon the authority of the First Nat'l
Bank case.
61303 U.S. 276 (1938).
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courts in the state when the money had gone unclaimed for a period
of seven years. Specifically in question were funds which had been
paid into the registry of a federal district court in Pennsylvania in
a diversity of citizenship case, and which, not having been claimed
for five years, had been deposited in the Treasury of the United
States as required by an act of Congress. The United States did not
claim tide to the funds, but argued that the state court's judgment
of escheat was an unconstitutional interference with a court of the
United States, an invasion of its sovereignty, and an attempt to exer-
cise jurisdiction over absent owners and moneys, neither of which
were shown to be within the state.
Refusing to follow the course which apparently had been staked
out by its First Nat'l Bank decision, a majority of the Supreme
Court" upheld the validity of the Pennsylvania statute's applica-
bility to these funds. The possession of property by a federal court,
wrote Mr. Justice Stone, does not affect the validity of state court
judgments concerning the property if those judgments are not "in
conflict with that [federal] court's authority to decide questions
within its jurisdiction and to make effective such decisions by its
control of the property."" Here the federal court's only other
function regarding the money was to pay it to its owner; and the
state court's judgment of escheat, substituting the state for the un-
known owner, did not interfere with this function. Specifically left
open for determination was the effect on the decree of the state
court of the nonresidence or absence of unknown claimants and the
absence of the fund from the state.
Here then the Pennsylvania statute was described as an escheat
type statute, the type held inapplicable to national banks in the First
Nat'l Bank case. The Court seemed careful, however, to restrict
its judgment to the facts of the case and to formulate a "non-inter-
ference" theory of validity. Perhaps this non-interference theory,
though difficult to apply, was intended to distinguish this situation
from the First Nat'l Bank decision; but even this conjecture is
rendered uncertain by Mr. Justice Stone's failure to refer even once
to the First Nat'l Bank holding.
Adding new fuel to the flames of confusion over the precise
extent of the First Nat'l Bank holding, was the Court's opinion
in the final bank deposits case of the middle ages - Anderson Nat'l
62 Justices Cardozo and Reed did not participate in this decision.
63 303 U.S. 276, 281 (1938).
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Bank v. Luckett.64 The Kentucky statute here in issue, described
by the Court as "a comprehensive scheme for the administration of
abandoned bank deposits,"65 declared presumptively abandoned de-
posits held by all banks in the state concerning which the owner had
not negotiated in writing, or changed the amount, or requested inter-
est on his pass book, or notified the bank of some other transaction,
within a period of ten years (twenty-five years in the case of non-
demand deposits). Banks holding such deposits were required to
.report them annually to the state, a copy of which report was posted
on the courthouse door in the county where the bank was located.
After a specified time, the bank was then instructed to turn the
deposits over to the state, being subject to penalty for failure to do
so. A claim for these surrendered deposits could be made at any
time unless the state, as authorized, instituted judicial proceedings
to determine conclusively the abandonment of the deposits, in which
event the statute afforded claimants five years in which to assert
their interests.
The plaintiff national bank attacked the statute on two grounds:
first, that the requirement of surrender of the deposits without re-
course to judicial proceedings violated due process; and second, that
the statute infringed the national banking laws and was an uncon-
stitutional interference with instrumentalities of the federal govern-
ment.
Mr. Chief Justice Stone's opinion for a unanimous Court first
considered the due process question, noting as "no longer open to
doubt"68 the power of a state, by proper procedures, to compel sur-
render of abandoned bank deposits. Looking to the notice pro-
visions of the statute and to the time-honored practice of court-
house door postings in Kentucky, the Court concluded that this
form of advertisement was as effective as newspaper publication, "7
particularly when accompanied by a seizure of the property by the
state. Upholding the notice provisions, the Court went further to
propose that strict judicial proceedings were not "an indispensable
64 321 U.S. 233 (1944).
65 Id. at 238.
66 d. at 240.
67 One observer has warned that the sustainment of the courthouse-door posting
method of notice here might have rested solely upon the historical use of the practice
in Kentucky and that such provision might not constitute sufficient notice in other states
not possessing such tradition. He suggests newspaper publication as the safest form
of notice. Shestack, Disposition of Unclaimed Property - A Proposed Model Act, 46
ILL. L. Riv. 48, 54-55 (1951). Another writer has expressed confidence in the notice
provisions of the Uniform Act. Note, 42 IowA L. REv. 399, 409 (1957).,
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requirement of due process"" especially, as here, where adminis-
trative decisions were expressly subject to court review. Thus, the
due process argument of the national bank was rejected.
The plaintiff's second contention called forth observations by
the Court that the statute did not discriminate between state and
national banks, and that it did not conflict with the national bank-
ing laws. Not cited, but clearly utilized, was Stone's Klein analy-
sis to the effect that one of the primary functions of the bank in-
volved payment of the deposits to those entitled thereto, and that
the state's substitution of itself for the unknown depositor did not
interfere with this function.
In meeting the second contention, the Court was squarely con-
fronted with its First Nat'l Bank decision. Declining the bank's
request to apply that decision, as well as the state's invitation to
overrule it, the Court chose instead to distinguish the cases. The
California statute condemned in the First Nat'l Bank case, the
Court explained, provided for the "escheat of depositors' accounts
merely because of their dormancy for the specified period, without
any determination of abandonment in fact." 9  By this Kentucky
statute, however, "dormancy without more is made the statutory
ground for the state's taking inactive bank accounts into its custody,
the state assuming the bank's obligation to the depositors.
Escheat or forfeiture to the state may follow, but only on proof
of abandonment in fact."7  Thus, the Court concluded, "we can-
not say that the protective custody of long inactive bank accounts,
for which the Kentucky statute provides, and which in many cir-
cumstances may operate for the benefit and security of depositors
will deter them from placing their funds in national banks in that
state."'" On this reasoning, the plaintiff bank's second contention
was rejected.
Although one might harbor substantial doubts as to the judicial
honesty of the Court's "interpreting" the First Nat'l Bank decision
to the point of rewriting it, it would appear that the Anderson Nat'l
Bank case, in effect, removed practically all restrictions on the
state's power over abandoned bank deposits. And though one might
heartily applaud the results, he cannot but wonder at the Court's
utilization of the escheat-custodial distinction to uphold the statute
6 8 Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 246 (1944).
69Id. at 251.
7o Id. at 251-52.
71 Id. at 252.
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in the latter case when that distinction was not mentioned in
the First Nat'l Bank case, and with respect to the "interference
theory" - the stated basis of the First Natl Bank case - either an
escheat or custodial statute would seem to incur its objections. And
finally, in predicting the status of the present "law" on unclaimed
bank deposits, one cannot feel too comfortable with the knowledge
that though the Court had the opportunity to overrule the First
Nat'l Bank decision, it refused to do so but instead tucked it away
perhaps for possible use in the future.7"
The year 1945 brought to the Supreme Court a plea by a hos-
pital for a declaratory judgment of unconstitutionality of a North
Dakota statute requiring corporations owning real estate used or
usable for farming or agriculture, (except that reasonably necessary
in the conduct of their business) to dispose of the land within 10
years, under penalty of escheat and sale by the county, with pay-
ment of the proceeds to the corporation. Refusing this plea, a
majority of the Court 7' in Asbury Hosp. v. Cass County74 held that
as the state possessed power to exclude a foreign corporation from
doing business or holding property within its boundaries, it like-
wise had the power to enact this legislation after allowing entrance
of the corporation. To the due process argument of the plaintiff,
the Court answered that "the due process clause does not guarantee
that a foreign corporation when lawfully excluded as such from
ownership of land in the state shall recapture its cost."75  The stat-
utory escheat procedure, said the Court, would afford the corpora-
tion a fair opportunity to realize the value of the land and nothing
more was required. The opinion, upholding this considerable
regulatory exercise of escheat power by the state is reminiscent of
Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
United States,76 previously discussed.
Closing out this consideration of the Court's decisions in the
middle ages is the case of Oyama v. California involving, as did
72 Immediately following the state court's decision in the Anderson Nat'l Bank case,
the Assistant Attorney General of Kentucky examined the decision, comparing it with
the Supreme Court's opinions in the First Nat'l Bank and Security Say. Bank cases.
He correctly predicted that "the case will, at least, be an interesting one to follow in the
event it reaches the United States Supreme Court." Wilson, The Disposition of Dor-
mant Bank Deposits and Other Unclaimed Property, 32 KY. L.J. 41, 62 (1943).
73 Justices Black and Jackson were not included in this majority.
74 326 U.S. 207 (1945).
75 Id. at 212.
76 136 U.S. 1 (1890).
77 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
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the previously mentioned Cockrill case, the statutorily created pre-
sumptive rule of evidence in the California alien land-statute. Here
contested was the application of this rule which subjected to escheat
proceedings land which had been paid for by an alien Japanese
father and held in the name of his citizen minor son. Mr. Chief
Justice Vinson delivered the majority opinion of the Court which,
although assuming the constitutionality of the alien land statute
itself, held the presumption as applied in this situation to violate
the son's equal protection of the laws and his privileges as an Amer-
ican citizen. This holding of the Court was based upon the theory
that while generally in California when a parent pays for a con-
veyance to his child the presumption is that a gift is intended, here,
because of the statute, the presumption was against the citizen-son
for the sole reason that his father was a Japanese. Thus, the son
"was saddled with an onerous burden of proof which need not be
borne by California children generally.""8 In a footnote, the Court
distinguished its holding in the Cockrill case on the grounds that
there the complainants "argued that the statutory presumption
denied equal protection to the Japanese, not to the donee as in the
present case."79  The Court refused to rule upon a similar conten-
tion by the assailants here, and so would not reconsider either the
Cockrill case or the case of Terrace v. Thompson,"° upholding the
constitutionality of the alien land statute itself.
Two concurring opinions, one by Mr. Justice Black, concurred
in by Mr. Justice Douglas, and one by Mr. Justice Murphy, agreed
to by Mr. Justice Rutledge, argued for the unconstitutionality of
the entire California alien land statute. A dissenting opinion by
Mr. Justice Reed, agreed to by Mr. Justice Burton, concluded that
"unless the California Land Laws are to be held unconstitutional,
we think the presumption and its resulting effects must be accepted
as legal."'" Mr. Justice Jackson also dissented, declaring "I do not
see how this Court, while conceding the State's right to keep the
policy on its books, can strip the State of the right to make its Act
effective." 2
Thus, the permissive attitude of the Court in regard to alien
land statutes which was indicated in its earlier decisions was not ad-
hered to in this case. And, in view of the strong concurring opini-
78 Id. at 644.
79 Id. at 645 n.27.
80263 U.S. 197 (1923).




ons in the case, it is not surprising that constitutional law observers
now harbor doubts as to the continued validity of the statutes them-
selves."3
C. Of Late: An Era of Permissiveness (1948-1965)
Again, in point of years, no distinct line can be drawn between
the group of cases examined in this section and those considered
previously. And though the general theme remains, one reading
the Court's opinions in these recent cases gains the impression- of
an increase in tempo. That is to say, it appears that the various
Justices began to become more immediately aware of and con-
cerned with the practical objectives of the state statutes. Divisions
within the Court arose, resulting in debates as to the actual and
potential effects of these statutes in the particular situations be-
fore the Court; and indeed as to the immediate and long-range re-
sults of the Court's decisions. Even with this change of pace, pre-
cipitated in part no doubt by the Court's own rather general treat-
ment of the cases previously discussed, the magnitude of the prob-
lems involved is pointed up by the continued absence of definitive
answers. The struggle, nevertheless, is well worth examining.
In March of 1948 the Court decided the case of Connecticut
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore.4 In that case, nine insurance com-
panies, incorporated outside the State of New York, were asking for
a declaration of the invalidity of that state's abandoned property
statute as it applied to insurance policies issued for delivery in New
York on the lives of residents of New York by companies incorpo-
rated in other states. Generally, the statute provided for the pre-
sumption of abandonment of moneys owed by the companies on
such policies which had gone unclaimed for seven years, for the
report and advertisement of these moneys, and for their payment
to the state. A six-member majority of the Court, in an opinion by
Mr. Justice Reed, sustained the validity of this statute, but with
two specified reservations: first, the Court refused to pass upon the
validity of the statute's application in instances when the insured
person, after delivery of the policy, ceased to be a resident of New
York; and second, in instances when the beneficiary of the policy
was not a resident of New York at its maturity.
The majority first considered the companies' contention that
8 3 
"State courts have interpreted the decisions in the Oyama and Takabashi cases
as repudiating the doctrine of Terrace v. Thompson." 2 FREUNn, StJTHERLAN., HOWE
& BROWN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1778 (2d ed. 1961).
84 333 U.S. 541 (1948).
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the statute impaired the obligation of their contract with the in-
sured, and observed that without the statute the companies them-
selves would retain the unclaimed funds. Therefore, the Court
stated that the money "may fairly be said to be abandoned property
and subject to the care and custody of the state and ultimately to
escheat."85  It could see no difference, it said, in the state's power
to seize these funds and in its power to take abandoned bank de-
posits.86 The administrative provisions of the statute were thought
to be sufficiently fair.
The second and primary argument of the companies was that
the statute violated due process, as New York had no power to seize
the funds, this being a power possessed only by the state of incor-
poration. The Court, however, phrased the question as being
whether New York had "sufficient contacts"87 with the transac-
tions in question, and concluded that it did: "It is the beneficiary of
the policy, not the insurer, who has abandoned the moneys.88 The
problem of what another state than New York may do," said the
Court, "is not before us. That question is not passed upon."8
Thus, although deciding that New York, the residence of the in-
sured, could claim the funds, the Court expressly did not decide that
other states might not also possess "sufficient contacts" to assert
this power.
Two dissenting opinions were written. In one of these Mr.
Justice Frankfurter argued that the Court should not decide the
case, because too many unrepresented interests were involved, and
urged that all states possessing such interests should be heard in one
suit: "It is precisely for the settlement of such controversies among
the several States that the Constitution conferred original jurisdic-
tion upon this Court."9  In the other dissent Mr. Justice Jackson,
with the concurrence of Mr. Justice Douglas, argued that in this
declaratory judgment proceeding the Court must decide upon the
statute in its entirety without reservation, and agreed that jurisdic-
tion should not here be exercised. But if the case is to be decided,
he contended, then a more definite standard than "sufficient con-
tacts" should be evolved by the Court for the guidance of all par-
851d. at 546.
8 6 This ground of the Court's holding was warmly approved by the commentator
in Note, 58 YALE LJ. 628, 635 (1949).
87 Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541, 548 (1948).
88Id. at 551.




ties." He predicted that "while we may evade it for a time, the
competition and conflict between states for 'escheats' will force us
to some lawyerlike definition of state power over this subject."92
Jackson realistically formulated the dilemma which he thought
the majority was inadvertently creating for itself: "In sustaining
the broad claims of New York, we either cut off similar and per-
haps better rights of escheat by other states or we render insurance
companies liable to two or more payments of their single liability." 3
Hence in this first of the recent cases, although the escheat
power of New York was upheld, clouds of doubt as to future devel-
opments hung heavy on the horizon."
The most recent case involving state escheat statutes and banks
in which the Supreme Court has written an opinion is Roth v. De-
lano.5 The attorney general for the State of Michigan brought an
action in the federal district court for a declaratory judgment that
Michigan's escheat statute applied to unclaimed dividends on proven
claims against a national bank in liquidation in that state, these divi-
dends being held by federal liquidators. The district court dismissed
the action on the authority of its "previous opinions," and this dis-
missal was affirmed by the court of appeals. On appeal, the Su-
preme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Jackson,9 6 remanded the
case to the Court of Appeals because it could not determine which
of the grounds included in the lower court's prior decisions it had
utilized, and also because Michigan had since repealed the escheat
statute in question. Before ordering the remand, however, the Court
undertook to indicate the status of the liquidation situation in re-
gard to its own prior decisions. In doing so, it construed the Anderson
Nat'l Bank v. Luckett 7 decision as holding in substance that "the
9 1 Mr. Justice Jackson set forth a number of other "contacts" which he claimed
would be sufficient to provide states with power to claim these funds. Id. at 558-59.
921d. at 563. It is not difficult to find an abundance of agreement with the
Justice's prediction. See, e.g., Note, 35 VA. I. REV. 336 (1949).
9 3 Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541, 560 (1948).
94 For a discussion of some of the problems in the case as it stood prior to the
Supreme Court's decision, and for an analysis of the strength of various state claims to
intangibles, see Comment, 1 STAN. L. REV. 342 (1949). An approving summary of
the Court's decision appears in Note, 58 YALE UJ. 628 (1949). A later examination
concluded that the state of the holder possessed a stronger claim to escheat of such prop-
erty than did the state of the last known owner. Note, 69 HARV. L REV. 1408 (1952).
The opposite view was taken by Professor Shestack who contended that the residence
of the last known owner should be the determinative test. Shestack, supra note 67, at
63. Thus, disagreement was not confined to the Justices on the Court.
05338 U.S. 226 (1949).
06 Nr. Justice Douglas did not participate in the decision.
97 321 U.S. 233 (1944).
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Constitution of the United States does not prohibit a State from
escheating deposits in a national bank located and actively doing
business therein, abandoned by their owners or belonging to miss-
ing persons."98 Further, said the Court, although the state's escheat
powers might be invalidly asserted in a manner which would inter-
fere with the federal liquidation procedure, "absent such inter-
ference with a federal statute, the basic assumption of the State here
that nothing in the Constitution prevents it from escheating the
specific claims here involved is made clear in our recent decisions."' "u
One might read from the decision a green light for state power
to escheat unclaimed funds held in federal liquidation proceed-
ings."°' States might also find reassuring the Court's broad con-
striuction of the Anderson Nat'l Bank holding.
In 1951 the case of Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey... brought
to the Supreme Court the type of state escheat claim which had been
foreseen by the dissenting Justices in Connecticut Mut. Life. Under
procedures specified by its statutes, the state had obtained a judg-
ment of escheat in regard to shares of stock and unpaid dividends
held by a domestic corporation and owing to persons whose last
known addresses were outside the state, this property having gone
unclaimed for 14 years.' The escheat judgment had been affirmed
by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
Here then was the reverse side of the coin - while in the
Connecticut Mut. Life case the state's claim to escheat had been
based upon the residence of the owners, regardless of the state of
incorporation of the holding company, here the claim was founded
upon the company's domicile, regardless of that of the owners. And,
in a five-to-four decision, the Court sustained this claim also. Again
writing for the majority of the Court, Mr. Justice Reed divided his
opinion into sections. First examined were the notice provisions
of the New Jersey statute as construed by the state court and, on
9 8 Roth v. Delano, 338 U.S. 226, 230 (1949).
99 1d. at 230-3 1, citing the Anderson Nat'l Bank and Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co.
cases.
100 At least one commentator, however, contended that the quoted portion of the
Court's opinion in Roth was "misleading," and that the very question in issue was
whether the state statute did conflict with the national banking laws, and that a future
holding of the existence of such a conflict is quite possible. Shestack, supra note 67
at 59.
101341 U.S. 428 (1951); noted in 27 IND. L.J. 113 (1951).
102 For a general discussion of the corporation's problem of the "lost" shareholder,
see Note, 62 HARv. L. REv. 295 (1948). Elsewhere, it has been observed that "grow-
ing lists of unclaimed stocks have become a nuisance to some corporations." Comment
46 ILL. L. REv. 82, 98 (1951).
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the basis of the requirements laid down by Mr. Justice Brandeis
in the Security Say. Bank case, the contents of the publication were
approved. Rejecting the impairment of contract argument of the
company, the majority noted that here, as usual, there had been
no contract between the parties in the event the owners did not claim
the property" 3 and that thus it was proper that the funds be used
"for the general good rather than for the chance enrichment of
particular individuals or organizations."1 4  Next considered were
the contentions that because of the non-residence of the last known
owners and of the immediate escheat induced by the statute, New
Jersey did not possess sufficient contacts with the property to take
it. Observing that "the fact that this is immediate escheat is not
significant,"' 5 the majority surmised that as the state could con-
trol unclaimed property in the hands of national banks (citing the
Anderson Nat'l Bank case), and dispose of funds owed residents
by foreign insurance companies (citing the Connecticut Mut. Life
case), certainly it could escheat abandoned property held by domes-
tic corporations. And finally, concluded the majority, the Standard
Oil Company would not be subjected to double liability for this
property because the full faith and credit clause of the United States
Constitution.. would command respect by the other states of the
New Jersey Supreme Court's judgment."7
Again dissenting, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, with Mr. Justice
Jackson's concurrence, noted that under the holding of Connecticut
Mut. Life, the state of the last known owner of the abandoned
stock had the stronger claim to it. To the majority's full faith
and credit proposal, he countered: "The Constitution ought not be
placed in an unseemly light by suggesting that the constitutional
rights of the several States depend on, and are terminated by, a race
of diligence."' ' Another dissenter, Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom
Mr. Justice Black concurred, also believed that other states possessed
103 It has been suggested that a corporation, by charter amendment, might bar
escheat by a provision to the effect that unclaimed dividends would be automatically
assigned to the corporation. Doubt is indicated, however, as to the practicality of such
a step. See Note, supra note 94, at 1409-10. More encouragement is given to similar
steps in Ely, Escheats: Perils and Precautions, 15 Bus. LAW. 791, 802-03 (1960).
104 Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 436 (1951).
'05 Id. at 438.
1o US. CONST. art IV, § 1.
10 7 In reference to this portion of the decision, it has been written: "Full faith and
credit appears to be an inadequate tool with which to protect a holder of intangible
property from the dangers of multiple escheat." Comment, 59 MICH. L. Rmv. 756,
784 (1961).
1 80 Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.. 428, 444 (1951).
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legitimate escheat claims to the property, and further that though
any one of these states might enact a custodial statute, holding the
property until a final determination could be made, here New Jer-
sey's immediate escheat statute went too far."0 9
The obvious quandary left unsolved by the Supreme Court's
holdings in the Connecticut Mut. Life and Standard Oil cases,"' as
well as the dose division of Justices within the Court in the latter
case, made it not unlikely that the Court would again be called to
task in this area. What may be cause for surprise is that ten years
were to elapse before this call would come."' At any rate, on
December 4, 1961, Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania1"2 was
decided.
Western Union's factual situation, as well as the spcific prop-
erty it involved, constituted slight variations from the above two
cases. The case serves as an apt illustration of the extent to which
the quest for unclaimed property is now being pressed in some of
109 One writer described the Standard Oil case as 'classic," and indicative of New
Jersey's "pioneering efforts to escheat unclaimed stocks and dividends .. " McBride,
Unclaimed Dividends, Es-heat Stavtes and the Corporation Lawyer, 14 BUS. LAW. 1062,
1068 (1959).
110 One proposed answer to this quandary, offered shortly after the Standard Oil
decision, was legislation by Congress which would cast the federal government in a
kind of umpiring role between the states. Note, supra note 94, at 1413. Another writer
described the problem as follows: "Thus, holders can and some probably will find
themselves in the middle of a glorious intestate Donnybrook of multiple claims to the
same property." Ely, Pennsylvania Escheat Laws: Proposals for Revision, 64 DIcK. L.
REV. 329, 344 (1960). Still another: "on the basis of these two cases it is clear that
the possibility of multiple claims in the field of escheat of corporate stocks and dividends
is a reality." McBride, supra note 109, at 1070.
Ill Two intervening cases involving escheat but provoking little discussion of the
principle by the Court may be treated summarily. In Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S.
187 (1961), the state's escheat claim to property of intestates whose only heirs resided
in Yugoslavia was denied on the basis of the "most favored nation clause" in an 1881
treaty between the United States and Serbia. The unanimous Court concerned itself
almost exclusively with the history, contents, and intent of the treaty. These items,
concluded the Court, sustained the right of the foreign residents to inherit.
The other case, United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643 (1961), pitted the escheat
claim of Oregon against an act of Congress to the effect that upon the death of a vet-
eran, without will or heirs, in a veterans hospital, his personal property goes to the Gen-
eral Post Fund of the United States. In regard to the personal property of a mentally
incompetent veteran dying in a veterans hospital in Oregon, a seven-member majority
of the Court held for the United States. Determining the federal law clear on its face,
the majority opinion concluded that no contract between the Government and the vet-
eran was required; and that this law did not violate the principle of the Tenth Amend-
ment, as it was necessary and proper to the Government's constitutional power to
conduct war. A dissenting opinion for two of the Justices argued that the act of Con-
gress invaded a traditional state area and thus violated the Tenth Amendment: 'Today's
decision does not square with our conception of federalism." Id. at 654.
112368 U.S. 71 (1961), noted in 62 CoLuM. L REV. 708 (1962). The case's
background, as it stood immediately after decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
is examined in 36 NOTRE DAME LAW. 426 (1961).
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the states. The State of Pennsylvania began proceedings in its
courts to acquire undelivered money orders held by the defendant
telegraph company. As explained by the Court, these were money
orders which had been purchased by senders in the Pennsylvania
offices of the company, a New York corporation, for transmittal
by the company to payees outside Pennsylvania. Thus, the defend-
ant company was not a domestic corporation as in the Standard Oil
case; neither were many of the last known owners of the property
residents of the state as in Connecticut Mut. Life. And, for the
first time in recent years, the Supreme Court unanimously applied
the brakes to the state's claim, at least in its present context, by re-
versing the Pennsylvania court's escheat judgment.
Indicative of the change of winds within the Court was the fact
that the opinion for eight of the Justices was written by Mr. Jus-
tice Black, one of the dissenters in the Standard Oil case.
The Court's opinion purported to rest solely on the
proposition that unless the Pennsylvania courts possessed the power
to protect Western Union from the claims of other states for this
same property, then the escheat judgment denied the telegraph
company due process. Noting that the State of New York was
actually claiming a part of this same property and that neither New
York nor other possible claimant states were parties to this suit,
the Court concluded that the Pennsylvania courts did not possess
this protective power. The Court explained that "a state court
judgment need not be given full faith and credit by other States as
to parties or property not subject to the jurisdiction of the court
that rendered it."" 3
But, one might inquire, what of the holding in the Standard Oil
case? True, conceded the Court, but "here, unlike Standard Oil,
there is in reality a controversy between States, possibly many of
them, over the right to escheat part or all of these funds.""' 4 Fur-
ther, "these claims of New York were presented to us in both the
brief and oral argument of that State as amicus curiae.""' 5 Thus,
although the absence of New York as a party to the suit was used
as a basis for holding that the Pennsylvania court's judgment would
not protect Western Union from the claims of other states, the
presence of New York, at least as an amicus party, was utilized
to reject the full faith and credit holding of Standard Oil.
113368 U.S. 71, 75 (1961).
"14 Id. at 76.
115 Ibid.
1965]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
What then was the answer? As a reply, the Court reached
back to Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in the Connecticut Mut.
Life decision and asserted that "the rival state claimants here . . .
can invoke our original jurisdiction.""'  It was true, admitted the
Court, that it had decided previous escheat cases where rival state
claims "were in the offing";.. 7 still, it had never foreclosed the pos-
sibility of the exercise of its original jurisdiction. In Connecticut
Mut. Life, it explained, harking back to the dissent in Standard Oil,
New York had been permitted to take the unclaimed property only
as a custodian, and other claimants could have brought actions to
recover it at any time. So the escheat-custodial distinction was
again revived, despite the Court's previous bland statement in Stand-
ard Oil that this distinction was "not significant."
Having purported to establish that this was the type of situation
particularly appropriate for the exercise of its original jurisdiction,
the Court immediately proceeded to qualify its holding: "Whether
and under what circumstances we will exercise our jurisdiction to
hear and decide these controversies ourselves in particular cases,
and whether we might under some circumstances refer them to
United States District Courts, we need not now determine.""'  Like-
wise left to future determination were "the difficult legal questions
presented when many different States claim power to escheat intan-
gibles involved in transactions taking place in part in many
States."119
Agreeing only with the result of the majority holding, Mr. Jus-
tice Stewart argued that New York, as the domicile of the company,
possessed sole power to escheat these money orders, and that the
majority opinion "creates more problems than it solves." ' 0
For the purpose of establishing an element of stability or pre-
dictability concerning the Supreme Court's treatment of escheat
and unclaimed property statutes, hardly a more unsatisfying opinion
could have been written than that of the majority in Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania.2' One of the few points which the decis-
ion did seem to establish was that there is a definite constitutional
limit to the application of these statutes, at least through state courts.
This in turn pointed up movement on the part of the Court toward
116 Id. at 77.
117 Ibid.
1 18 Id. at 79.
119 Id. at 80.
120 Ibid.
121368 U.S. 71 (1961).
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the premise that the principle of escheat, traditionally held to be a
matter of concern only to the states, was now to be molded by the
guiding hand of the federal judiciary. Most of all, the opinion
indicated that more in this story of development was yet to be
told.Y2
2
The original jurisdiction invitation held out by the majority in
Western Union was promptly accepted, bringing to the Court those
"difficult legal questions" avowedly put aside at that time. Some
ten months following its decision in Western Union the Court
granted the State of Texas leave to invoke its original jurisdiction
by filing a complaint against the states of New Jersey and Pennsyl-
vania and a business corporation, the Sun Oil Company."2 3 This
complaint presented a controversy over which of the three states
could escheat amounts of money held and owed by Sun Oil to
many small creditors who had never collected them. 4 Complet-
ing the controversy, the State of Florida was permitted to intervene
with its escheat daim as well. 5
Taking a tact not indicated by its Western Union opinion, the
Court's first step in handling the case was to refer it to a special
master 'with directions that he summon witnesses, issue stibpoenas,
take evidence, and "submit such reports as he may deem appro-
priate."'2 6 Thus, not until the Court considered the special master's
report, almost two years later, did it render a decision in the case
of Texas v. New Jersey.2
From the four corners of the controversy came claims which
constituted a classic escheat nightmare for the Court. Texas
claimed the amounts held by Sun on grounds that they were either
evidenced on the books of Sun's two Texas offices or were owing
to persons whose last known addresses were in Texas. New
Jersey claimed the amounts in question as the state of Sun's incor-
poration. Pennsylvania's claim was bottomed on the point that
Sun's principal offices were located there. Finally, Florida asserted
122 "In all probability, however, conflict of laws in the escheat of intangibles area
will remain in its present confused and indeterminate state until the Supreme Court
has had a sufficient number of cases to lay down coherent guiding principles." 62
COLUM. L REv. 708, 716 (1962). To this observation, one could only inquire "how
long?"
123 Texas v. New Jersey, 371 U.S. 873 (1962).
124The various small debts were said to total $26,461.65, which had been owing to
approximately 1,730 creditors, primarily by checks, for periods of approximately 7 to
40 years.
125 Texas v. New Jersey, 373 U.S. 948 (1963).
126 Texas v. New Jersey, 372 U.S. 926 (1963).
127379 US. 674 (1965).
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its claim to a portion of the amounts because some of the creditors'
last known addresses were in Florida.
Again, Mr. Justice Black wrote for a majority of the Court,
his opinion here assuming, however, a unique tone of finality. 2 '
Indeed, he now saw the question presented as one "which should be
settled once and for all by a dear rule which will govern all types
of intangible obligations like these and to which all states may
refer with confidence."'2 9  With this new-found approach, he then
examined each claim asserted. To the Texas contention that the
test should be whether the state had "sufficient contacts" with the
debt, a test often used in the past, Mr. Justice Black explained that
the problem here was not one of contacts but of superiority of
claims. Here, he announced, "the 'contacts' test . . . is not really
any workable test at all."'30  Too, said the Justice, this test would
subject the states to the uncertainty of the Court's deciding each
escheat case on the basis of its particular facts, an uncertainty which
might engender much expensive litigation. Not mentioned were
the previously discussed decisions in which the Court had purported
to rely so heavily upon the contacts test.
New Jersey's suggested test - the state of incorporation of the
debtor - was likewise rejected, only more summarily. The fac-
tor of incorporation was simply too minor, it appeared, to confer
superiority of claim in this situation. Not mentioned were the pre-
viously discussed decisions in which the state-of-incorporation test
had been treated with greater hospitality.
Admitting the persuasiveness of Pennsylvania's asserted claim'3'
- location of the debtor's principal offices - the Court neverthe-
less made short shrift of it also. These debts, thought the majority,
were actually a liability to Pennsylvania, one not convertible to an
asset merely through the procedure of escheat. Further, utilization
of this test would make determination of the debtor's "principal of-
fice" a necessity in each case.'32
128Id. at 678. This need for finality was found in the points that the separate states
could not constitutionally settle the problem and that no applicable federal statute
existed. Id. at 677. After W~estern Union a proposal for a federal statute to resolve
conflicting state claims to abandoned property was made as a "solution which would
not be forced to run the gamut of fifty state legislatures." 1 HARV. J. LEG. 151, 152
(1964).
129 Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 678 (1965).
130 Id. at 679.
131 This persuasiveness derived from the benefits of the economy and laws which
this state had given the debtor. Id. at 680.
132 Similar uncertainty would result, said the Court, from attempting to determine
the state of the creation of the debt. Id. at 680.
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The answer to this quandary, concluded the Court, was to be
found in Florida's suggested test - the state of the creditor's last
known address according to the debtor's records. The adoption of
this test was recommended by manifold advantages: it would turn
upon an easily-resolved factual issue; it would recognize the debt as
an asset of the creditor; it would distribute escheats among the
states according to the commercial activities of their residents; and
it would make for ease in administration of escheat statutes. Finally,
the Court felt called upon to enter a brief footnote listing Western
Union, Standard Oil, Connecticut Mut. Life, Anderson Nat'l Bank,
and Security Sat. Bank, and noting that none of those cases "decided
the possible effect of conflicting claims of other states."' 3
The majority's work was now completed except for two final
questions: What if the debtor had no record of address of the
creditor, or what if the last known address state did not possess an
escheat statute? To each of these questions the Court gave the
same answer: The state of corporate domicile could then take the
property subject to relinquishing it if another state could later prove
last known address within its borders and the existence of an escheat
statute.
As in Western Union, the lone special opinion here was written
by Mr. Justice Stewart, but this time he dissented.' He did so
on the basis of his consistent view "that only the State of the
debtor's incorporation has power to 'escheat' intangible property
when the whereabouts of the creditor are unknown,"' 35 which he
explained was the holding of Standard Oil, Anderson Nat'l. Bank,
and Security Say. Bank. Charging the Court with overruling those
decisions, he noted the strangeness of talking of the domicile of
the creditor, which by hypothesis in these cases is unknown, and
expressed his disagreement with "giving the property to the State
within which is located the one place where we know the creditor
is not.""'
This then was Texas v. New Jersey,3 the Supreme Court's most
recent step along the route here traced. To one reading the opinion
out of subject-matter context, it may well appear as an innocent
effort to supply crucial answers to pressing questions. Hopefully,
131d. at 682, n.13.
134 Id. at 683.
'35 Ibid.
136 ibid.
137 379 U.S. 674 (1965).
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it might serve this purpose. But to one familiar with the his-
torical development of this area, to one who has noted the con-
flict, confusion, and frustrations caused mainly by the Court's
own earlier decisions, the bland, glossing style and first-impression
approach of the majority is irritating. For a "once and for all settle-
ment" of a problem with such dimensions and historical back-
ground, one simply expects more candid treatment from his nation's
highest court. Clearly the Court had been brought to its knees by
a problem of its own creation. Why would it not say so? Surely,
the ghost of Mr. Justice Jackson must have been hovering over-
head, pointing mockingly to his prediction of 17 years ago: "While
we may evade it for a time, the competition and conflict between
states for 'escheats' will force us to some lawyerlike definition of
state power over this subject."' 88
II. CONCLUSION
Stock has now been taken: what has been gained? Perhaps a
few brief summarizing observations might be appropriate in con-
clusion.
Analysis shows generally that the several states have broadly
utilized escheat and unclaimed property statutes as a means for
carrying out specific policies, for the regulation of human conduct,
and for the purposes of acquisition and revenue. Although empha-
sis in recent years has been placed upon the revenue aspects of these
statutes," 9 their other important functions should not be neg-
lected. 4 '
The Supreme Court's role in these developments has been an
interesting one. In its early decisions the Court's movements were
quite deliberate; e.g., it erected the technical barrier of "inquest of
office" to deter attempts by various states to escheat both real and
personal property from aliens. Later the Court, for a time af-
forded encouragement to the enactment of alien land statutes by
188 Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541, 563 (1948).
189 "The main reason for the awakened interest in unclaimed property lies in the fact
that most states have increased the scope of their activities far beyond their available
funds. New sources of revenue are thus being sought. One such source of revenue is
unclaimed property." Shestack, Disposition of Unclaimed Property - A Proposed
Model Act, 46 ILL. L. REv. 48, 49 (1951).
140 "Although the taking of custody of various types of unclaimed property provides
considerably more revenue than taking by outright escheat, the benefits such legislation
provides for the owner must take precedence over any revenue possibilities to the state."




the west coast states, only to then severely restrict the operation of
these statutes, if not to invalidate them in principle. On the other
hand, the early brandishment of the escheat weapon by Congress,
in an effort to curb the polygamy practices of the Mormons, was
approved.
Finally, the Court's early and crucial decision in Hamilton v.
Brown'4' laid the foundation upon which to build. The opinion
there dealt with the never-receding attacks of due process and
impairment of contract, considered the applicability of the escheat
principle to both realty and personalty, and posited the power
solidly within the control of the states themselves.
With the 1900's came questions of a more modern escheat
flavor for determination. A preliminary step was taken with the
holding that absenteeism by the owner constituted a sufficient basis
for the state's exercise of the escheat power to insure the adminis-
tration of his estate. In 1911, in Provident Institution for Say. v.
Malone," the Court rendered its first decision on a pure unclaimed
property statute, and seemed to pronounce the patient in good
health. A series of cases then followed in which the Court took
ad hoc approaches to the problem of applying specific state statutes
to instrumentalities of the federal government. Although a note
of uncertainty was injected when the Court declared California's
statute inapplicable to national banks, this doubt was subsequently
lost in the shuffle of decisions sustaining the application of other
statuies to federal courts, to national banks in liquidation, and to
national banks in operation.
In the period beginning around 1948, the Coures opinions on
escheat and unclaimed property took on a noticeable change in
tempo. This change received its impetus from the application
by revenue hungry states of escheat statutes to intangibles with
which more than one state had contact. Though the decisions in
both Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. v. Moore'4 3 and Standard Oil Co. v.
New Jersey... upheld such efforts, a dilemma of major proportions
was obviously in development. Moreover, sharp divisions within
the Court came to the surface.
In 1961, in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania,'45 the
former minority view of the Court became its majority holding.
141161 U.S. 256 (1896).
142221 U.S. 660 (1911).
143 333 U.S. 541 (1948).
144 341 U.S. 428 (1951).
145368 U.S. 71 (1961).
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In an unclear but innovating opinion, the Court established that
Pennsylvainia had crossed a previously camouflaged line separat-
ing constitutional and unconstitutional applications of escheat stat-
utes. Although other points established by the decision were
clouded,'46 one immediate result appeared - the federal judiciary's
assumption of the role of umpire over multistate claims on intangi-
bles. Yet the vagueness of Western Union itself was helpful to the
Court, as it attempted in Texas v. New Jersey..7 to formulate with
finality certain rules of the road. And though the cavalier treat-
ment in Texas v. New Jersey4' is objectionable, the pronounce-
ment is definite - last known address of the owner is the magic
phrase. Whether this phrase will adequately serve the purpose
of certainty, now so earnestly desired by the Court, and aid in the
development of other guides, remains for the future.
The key word, then, in an evaluation of the Supreme Court's
treatment of state escheat and unclaimed property statutes, is per-
missiveness. Generally, these statutes have fared well at the Court's
hand. The Western Union thorn, pricking only multistate claims
on intangibles, does not shade this evaluation. The reciprocity
provision of the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property
Act,149 and now the Court's rule in Texas v. New Jersey,"5 already
illumine avenues of escape from the multistate dilemma. States
considering the enactment of statutes on escheat and unclaimed
property can, in general, look with encouragement upon the
Supreme Court's performance thus far.
146 "In the final analysis, it must be said that Western Union has by no means re-
solved entirely the problem of multistate claims of power to escheat. No dear guide-
lines have been established to aid state administrators in determining the extent of their
own powers... ." Note, 76 HARV. L REV. 54, 139 (1962). Indeed, the decision
has been cited by one of the Justices as an example of the Court's inconsistency. See
the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v.
Rickover, 369 U.S. 111, 116 (1962).
147 379 U.S. 674 (1965).
148 Ibid.
1 49 UNIFoRtM DIsPosrrIoN OF UNcLAIMED PROPERTY ACT 5 10. "One of the
most comprehensive and complete solutions to the problem of multiple escheat is the
suggested solution of the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act." Comment,
59 MICH. L. REv. 756, 779 (1961).
160379 U.S. 674 (1965).
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